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The basic needs 
strategy as an option 
Its possibilities in 
the Latin American 
context
Jorge Graciarena*
The basic need strategy has been intensively dis­
cussed at international forums in recent years, but 
there still exists today a certain ignorance regarding 
its content and the economic and political factors 
which would favour its establisment and consolida­
tion. Accordingly, the author begins by defining it 
clearly, for which purpose he contrasts it with other 
strategies, particularly those aimed at eradicating 
poverty and other which combine elements of 
several options in a somewhat eclectic manner.
After this definition, he devotes the body of the 
article to an analysis of some national and inter­
national political requirements of the basic needs 
strategy. As regards the internal political order, he 
emphasizes that in order for this strategy to prosper, 
the political régime must be one which, supported 
by a participating and organized community that 
controls the State apparatus, can guide and strength­
en the strategy’s implementation and at the same 
time overcome the innumerable obstacles it would 
face. International relations would require the 
establisment of a new order, of the type proposed 
under the system of “collective self-reliance”, which 
sees basic needs as its central objective.
Given these and other political requirements 
which he also considers, he deems it unlikely that 
this strategy will be adopted within the shortterm in 
Latin America. Taking into account the rapidly 
changing times and the seeds of change they bring 
with them, however, he does not consider it as a 
useless, exercise to start defining more precise 
features of this “concrete utopia”, for it should not 
surprise anyone if, in a few years’ time, it were to 
become the most likely horizon of our peoples.
*D irector o f  the Social Affairs Division o f  CEPA L.
1. Two antithetical proposals: poverty versus 
basic needs
In this rapid examination of some recent propos­
als concerning poverty and basic needs, atten­
tion is focused on a small but significant group 
of such proposals which are shown under A and 
B in the footnote.1 These two proposals have 
been chosen because they adequately represent 
the extreme positions of the broad spectrum of 
proposed hypothetical options and possibil­
ities which dominate the international debate 
today. It will thus be possible to discern more 
clearly the differences between them and to 
clarify some of the reasons which have con­
verted them into a motive for confrontation. 
The basic aim is to distinguish the true nature 
of the clearest and most influential proposals 
concerning poverty and basic needs when 
compared with one another in a broad frame of 
reference and as possible options not only in 
the face of problems of want and mass poverty 
but also as real options for social development 
and change.
These proposals are essentially very differ­
ent in their axiological and ideological assump­
tions, their basic principles and aims, the time 
horizon involved, and their social and political 
coverage. As regards their relationship to the 
prevailing social order they can be considered 
as forming a scale ranging from acceptance of 
the status quo (World Bank) to radical rejection
^ h e  following proposals are considered:
A. Poverty. Account is taken mainly of the World Bank 
proposals contained in The Assault on World Poverty, 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, 
which also includes the speech made by Robert S, 
McNamara in Nairobi (annex 15, pp. 90 et seq); and the 
World Development Report, 1978, Washington, World 
Bank, 1978, chapter IV, which reproduces the basic 
position maintained in the aforementioned study.
B. Another development and basic needs. First, reference 
may be made to the approach to basic needs in the 1975 
Dag Hammarskjöld Report entitled What Now: 
Another Development (Development Dialogue), 
Uppsala, Sweden, 1975, N.° 1/2, and the group of 
studies “Towards a theory of rural development” in 
Development Dialogue, Uppsala, Sweden, Dag 
Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1977: 2, The collective 
book by Marc Nerfin (comp.), Hacia otro desarrollo: 
Enfoques y estrategias, Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1978, may 
also be consulted. All these studies are considered as 
forming a relatively homogeneous group. Also along 
this line of thought is the study by the Fundación 
Bariloche, Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin 
American World Model, Ottawa, International Devel­
opment Research Centre, 1978.
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of the major social systems in force and even of 
industrial civilization itself (“another devel­
opment”).
They can be classified in the same way by 
the elements they include: while the first 
proposal is not much more than a limited 
poverty policy composed of palliatives that 
would fit in with any political order and style of 
development, the “other development” pro­
posals aim at the complete reorganization of the 
internal and international social order, as well 
as that of the individual and social personality.
The first proposal is intended to provide 
solutions only to the problem of mass poverty 
visualized as an anomalous situation which 
must be “eradicated” from the social body, 
with secondary concern for population growth 
and income distribution, whereas the “other 
development”, in contrast, covers a broader 
spectrum of problems ranging from nutrition 
and non-renewable natural resources, via 
population and the ecological balance, to 
democracy, the international order, social 
justice and the overcoming of human alien­
ation, all of which are envisaged as an inter­
related and mutually dependent complex. The 
mere possibility of purchasing a “basket” of 
essential goods is by no means sufficient: what 
this proposal calls for is to find ways of 
achieving the full development of the human 
state.
Consequently, the substantive disparity 
between these proposals is so considerable that 
most of the comparisons made are perfectly 
arbitrary, since they are out of context. To 
define this significant frame of reference is thus 
the main purpose of these notes, which merely 
aim to contribute some elements that will help
C. In other proposals, attempts have been made to 
combine the approach based on the poverty situation 
with the basic needs transformation approach. A 
significant effort in this respect is represented by the 
ILO report Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A 
One-World Problem, Geneva, ILO, 1976, and the 
Declaration o f  Principles and Programme o f  Action 
adopted at the Tripartite World Conference on Em­
ployment, Income Distribution and Social Progress 
and the International Division of Labour, Geneva, 
June 1976. The World Bank study entitled Redistribu­
tion with Growth, IBRD, Washington, 1974, is also 
in keeping with this intermediate line, eclectic in one 
sense and reformist in another.
to avoid such widespread fallacious interpreta­
tions.
Within an immediatist perspective, it may 
be said that the conventional developmental- 
ism approach to the poverty problem is that it 
should be eradicated or extirpated without 
postponing or reducing growth nor substan­
tially altering the structural features of the 
economy and power or, more generally, the 
dynamics of the prevailing style of devel­
opment.2 Poverty is thus seen as a self-con­
tained and isolated problem, with no projec­
tions over other structural areas or broader 
social processes. Hence the majority of the 
proposals in this connexion are assistance- 
oriented and paternalistic (channelling of re­
sources from above to enable the “poverty 
line” to be crossed) and normally stand outside 
general development policies and strategies.
In one way or another it is taken for granted 
that the benevolent action of the “invisible 
hand” and of market forces will stimulate the 
“trickle down”, thus mitigating the main wants 
of the poor until the so-called poverty gaps can 
be bridged. It is maintained that this is already 
happening and that the poor and marginal 
population will eventually be integrated in the 
dynamics of capitalist development. The con­
siderable growth of the Latin American econ­
omy in recent years has caused some to think 
that a high proportion of the poor are only just 
under the poverty line and that their relative 
importance is rapidly diminishing. Hence, it is 
held, it should be possible to assemble the 
necessary resources to alleviate their wants 
without excessive or intolerable sacrifices on 
the part of the high-income strata and there is 
nothing, therefore to prevent the eradication of 
poverty being put forward as a possibility 
compatible with the continuation of a concen­
trating development style and a minority con­
sumer society.
The “other development” approach, with 
the accent on the satisfaction of basic needs, is 
based on a very different assumption, which
2“Style of development” is understood here both as a 
mode of growth and operation of the internal economy 
and a form of its insertion in the international setting, and 
as a structure of power relations. See in this respect, J. 
Graciarena, “Power and development styles”, CEPAL 
Review, N.° 1, first half of 1976.
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from the start involves the elimination of 
poverty through a drastic reorganization of 
society and of human co-existence. Unlike the 
poverty approach, which is highly flexible and 
imitative (qualities which explain much of its 
credibility and appeal for the technocratic and 
hegemonic sectors), the explicit goal of the 
basic needs approach is the achievement of an 
egalitarian model of society. In some cases this 
model already has a label: the Fundación 
Bariloche proposes a participatory and anti- 
bureaucratic type of socialism. Several “other 
development” proposals include an elaborate 
explanation of this utopian model which con­
tains the main characteristics of the “new 
society” in which, it is claimed, there will be no 
poor because basic needs will be satisfied with 
the introduction of the changes proposed as 
requirements of the new societal model.
As will be appreciated from the foregoing, 
it is not possible to establish a gradual scale 
between the poverty and basic needs ap­
proaches, because the differences cannot be 
considered in the aggregate and the initial 
assumptions and objectives differ radically. In 
the one case, the eradication of poverty lies at 
the end of the road, while in the other the 
satisfaction of basic needs is established from 
the beginning as the structural principle of a 
model of society in which the poverty situation 
of want is, in principle, excluded as a real 
possibility.
All the proposals considered are based on 
an implicit or explicit diagnosis containing an 
evaluation of the present and a hypothesis 
concerning the scenario which is expected to 
prevail in the future. As already stated, the 
poverty approach postulates the continuity of 
the existing capitalist social order, while the 
basic needs approach is based on the convic­
tion of its forthcoming irreversible decline and 
the most radical thinkers do not even consider 
the possibility of a happy adjustment that could 
indefinitely prolong its present moribund 
state. For some there is no place in the long­
term future for anything but either authori­
tarian regimes of a corporative type or for a 
partieipatory type of socialism: under no cir­
cumstances is there any place for market 
capitalism. Although not always explicitly, the 
“other development” studies by the Funda­
ción Bariloche share this position. In the long 
run, consumer capitalism is seen as inevitably 
doomed, not only because it is unjust and 
inhuman, but also because it is predatory and 
destructive and at the same time incapable of 
confronting and resolving the challenges of the 
future. Moreover, it is held largley responsible 
for the existing threats to the future of mankind. 
This may be seen in the final balance of the 
Fundación Bariloche.3
For a proper understanding of these ap­
proaches it must be borne in mind that without 
exception all the so-called “world models” 
derive from admitted motivations generated by 
a situation involving a presumed threat, wheth­
er related to ecological, natural or demographic 
causes, the likelihood of a social revolution, or 
that of the collapse of civilization. This com­
mon anticipation of a possible catastrophe 
would seem to be the greatest constant in the 
various dissimilar proposals. It appears in 
McNamara s speech when he launches the 
World Bank’s “assault on world poverty”,4 in
3“In summary it can be said that economic growth 
with the preservation of the present income distribution 
system would, at the very best, delay the goal of a liberated 
humanity, free from suffering and misery, by at least two 
generations. It also implies the need to devote between 
three and five times more material resources to the achieve­
ment of the desired objectives, thus multiplying the 
pressure on the environment, and all this to maintain the 
careless consumption of privileged minorities... Lastly, 
the model shows within the obvious limitations of this 
type of work, that the fate of man does not depend, in the 
last instance, on insunnountable physical barriers but on 
social and political factors that man must modify. Their 
solution is not at all easy, because to change the organization 
and values of society, as history has shown, is much more 
difficult than overcoming physical limitations. To attempt 
the task, however, is the only way open to an improved 
humanity...”
" I t  could be said that this proposal is utopian, and that 
it would be more realistic to propose solutions that involve 
less radical modifications to the sociopolitical structure of 
the world. Those two hold this position should be re­
minded of the words of John Stuart Mill more that a century 
ago: 'For a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a 
small result: it simply does not produce any result at all’.” 
Fundación Bariloche, Catastrophe or New Society? op. 
cit., pp. 106-108 (our underlining).
4McNamara warns us about the possibility of a social 
revolution in the following tenns: “The real issue is 
whether indefinite procrastination is politically prudent. 
An increasingly inequitable situation will pose a growing 
threat to political stability ”; and “if, in the end, govern­
ments fail in that effort (a search for feasible solutions to 
the massive problem of absolute poverty), then I fe a r  it 
will matter a great deal less what their other successes
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the initial approach of the Hammarskjöld 
Report,5 and in the very title of the Fundación 
Bariloche study.6
While the World Bank’s proposal consi­
ders the poverty situation as the main threat to 
the status quo, the other proposals admit from 
the start the importance of the problems dealt 
with at United Nations world meetings on food, 
population, employment, natural resources 
and the environment, linking them with the 
critical debate on the future of the industrial 
civilization and the forecasts of a possible 
change in the historical system.
The poverty approach considers the socio­
political structure as a constant when historical 
change has reached unforeseen and unprece­
dented rates. Thus, the World Bank proposal 
boils down, in substance, to an increase in the 
productivity of the rural poor and the urban 
marginal population in order to improve their 
incomes. In McNamara’s own words: “...the 
basic problem  o f  poverty and growth in the 
developing world can be stated very simply. 
The growth is not equitably reaching the poor. 
And the poor are not significantly contributing 
to growth. Development strategies, therefore, 
need to be reshaped in order to help the poor to 
becom e more productive.” (From the preface 
to The Assault on World Poverty, p. v.; (our 
underlining).)
Clearly, therefore, this proposal centres on 
a specific problem whose solution is of very 
limited scope: to reduce the structural duality
may b e”. R. S. McNamara, “The Nairobi Speech” and 
preface, in World Bank, The Assault on World Poverty, 
p. 94 (our underlining).
5The Hammarskjöld Report recalls that “the problems 
brought to the fore, whether related to food, energy, 
population, the environment, economic and monetary 
matters or the 'limits of growth’, are only the most obvious 
signs o f  a ‘great disorder under heaven ”, It then men­
tions, as causes of the poverty crisis, alienation, interna­
tional relations, institutions and “the growing feelings of 
frustration that are disturbing the industrialized societies”; 
and adds; “The situation cannot be properly understood, 
much less transformed, unless it is seen as a whole”, p. 5 
(our underlining).
6The Fundación Bariloche admits the threat as de­
scribed by the Club of Rome in its study on “the limits to 
growth”, in which it envisages the possible depletion of 
natural resources and limits to economic growth due to the 
population explosion. See the Introduction to Catastrophe 
or New Society?, op. cit., pp. 7 and 11 et seq.
and social marginality mainly by raising the 
productivity of the poor in the hope that at the 
same time this will promote the reduction of 
demographic growth and indirectly solve the 
population problem.
This is a typically conservative and tech­
nocratic solution because everything depends 
on acceptance by the government (p. 4) and it is 
based on historical-structural parameters 
which do not change but which, on the contrary 
it is aimed to preserve as an important final 
objective. Hence the concern about the signifi­
cance of the threat as a possibility of changes in 
the power system. Therefore, the basic premise 
of the poverty approach is the need to ensure 
the continuity of the social system, and this is 
represented not only as a feasible possibility 
but also as a historical necessity for the survival 
of the present industrial civilization and cap­
italism. In this case, the social revolution is the 
much feared threat which a struggle is being 
waged to avert, while in the “other devel­
opment” proposal it constitutes the hope that 
holds out the possibility of a more promising 
future.
Thus, it is not possible for the basic needs 
option to offer such specific policy proposals 
and plans as the poverty approach, since its 
very origin implies a complete reorganization 
of society. However much the “other devel­
opment” proposals may attempt it, they cannot 
go much farther than the formulation of general 
policies; hence thairmain strength lies in their 
social appeal. Since thay have not as yet 
materialized historically —a very different case 
from the poverty approach, which already has 
an established and operative place in the social 
order— to bring this about it is essential to 
convince, attract and unite social forces, pre­
pared an ideology and propose a strategy of a 
very different kind, involving social and politi­
cal action within the framework of a new 
national and international social project rather 
than planning and programming within the 
status quo.
2. The basic needs proposal as a 
concrete utopia
In short, the basic needs proposal is a task for 
men of government, politicians and intel­
lectuals and is therefore pre-eminently a “con­
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crete utopia”. It should be remembered that 
the Hammarskjöld Report, which was specially 
prepared for the Seventh Special session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (1975), was 
directed at the Third World countries which 
were then promoting the establishment of a 
new international economic order. It is there­
fore more like a political manifesto than a 
partial strategy suitable for planners. The his­
torical feasibility of this proposal will basically 
depend on the extent to which it fits in with the 
crisis that is diagnosed and on its appeal for 
those who hear its call and see that they are in 
danger. The force it may generate and orient in 
a direction that is rationally compatible with a 
solution of the crisis will provide the only 
legitimate context for evaluating it and sub­
jecting it to criticism.
The “other development” proposals are 
often dismissed as utopian, in a clearly deroga­
tory sense, because they advocate profound 
and far-reaching structural and institutional 
changes, whereas the poverty approach is 
preferred as being more realistic and in keep­
ing with the facts, since it deals specifically 
with a supposedly limited and clearly defined 
problem and is therefore alien to any utopian 
digression which is felt to be so out of place in 
pragmatic technocratic circles.
Strictly speaking, utopian aspects are by no 
means alien to the technocratic approach, 
althouth the utopia is not expressly manifest or 
may be vehemently rejected as alien to the 
“technical truth” of this approach. It is just as 
utopian to postulate a future golden age as a 
mere extrapolation of the present as to postu­
late a different future as the result of its radical 
transformation. To wager on the continuity of 
the existing social order in the medium and 
long term may be as utopian (in the sense of 
unrealistic) as to wager on its radical transfor­
mation. Both possibilities will always be con­
jectures, although they will always be possible 
too. It all depends, then, on the predictive 
quality of the conjecture, on the way in which it 
adjusts to existential conditions, vital expe­
riences and personal motivations, and still 
more on its capacity to induce the proposed 
changes.
As so aptly recalled by the Fundación
Bariloche (pp. 7 and 108), a proposal of this 
kind, i.e., a “catastrophist" and change-promot­
ing proposal, is always to some extent in the 
nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy, that is, a 
prophecy which induces and creates the con­
ditions fot its own fulfilment, when, of course, 
historical circumstances are favourable. What 
counts first of all is the initial impulse, an idea 
which finds social acceptance because it re­
sponds to a vital, intense and deep-seated 
need. This idea could very well be the catalyst 
of the process. The introduction to the Ham­
marskjöld Report is entitled “To set in motion 
the process of change”, and it is headed by the 
following Chinese proverb: “Even the longest 
journey begins with the first step”.
This type of wishful thinking, which tends 
to be an inwardly cherished myth while on the 
way to becoming an idée force, involves greater 
intellectual risks for those who advocate it than 
the tacit defence of the continuity of the status 
quo. In normal times nothing seems firmer or 
more secure than the latter, but when many 
things which appeared to be stable and secure 
vanish into thin air or rapidly collapse and 
troubled times set in, not a few of the old 
convictions waver and confidence in the dura­
tion of the prevailing order weakens and tends 
to evaporate. This is the high road to crisis, 
which operates as a feed-back mechanism 
creating its own forces of inertia that project it 
beyond its initial impulse towards a historical 
horizon which may bring either its partial or 
complete solution or else chaos and dissocia­
tion.
Continuity, change: who can convincingly 
demonstrate the possibility of either? The 
intellectual dilemma of choice may be resolved 
in various ways, either by means of ideological 
and axiological convictions or through para­
lysing indecision. If these possibilities are 
judged as criteria applicable to reality, how­
ever, because of their capacity to represent 
concrete situations and real processes, and 
historical trends begin to be visualized dif­
ferently and are seen to change their course, 
both the old and the new palliatives cease to be 
operative and the opportunity of change seems 
to impose itself by its own weight. It might be 
adduced that continuity and change are com­
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patible options. But this would be an ambi­
valent approach consistent with the poverty 
proposal but wholly incompatible with the 
“other development” approach, because the 
latter claims to be nothing less than the seed of 
a “new society”.
Therefore, nothing could be more arbitrary 
than to place all these options on the same 
plane and consider them as relatively inter­
changeable. The basic needs proposals cannot 
be judged on what they have not got and cannot 
have, and still less should they be placed 
outside the conceptual context from which they 
originated and to which they refer, i.e., the 
menacing controversy opened up by the 
studies of the Club of Rome, the reports of 
world conferences on nutrition, population, 
environment and employment, and above all 
the discussion of the viability of capitalism and 
its capacity to solve the major present and 
future problems of mankind.
The poverty approach has very little to do 
with this plane since it points in a different 
direction and covers a much shorter distance 
and problems of considerably less scope. It is 
not claimed to be anything but a political 
strategy of palliatives, of an immediatist nature, 
aimed only at forging ahead and preserving the 
existing status quo.
3. On other eclectic proposals
A great many efforts have been made to bring 
the poverty and “other development” propos­
als closer together. These attempts are in two 
directions, and are frequently combined. The 
first type of attempt consists of establishing a 
sometimes indefinite time sequence between 
the satisfaction of material and non-material 
needs. The second takes the form of reducing 
the latter to the large-scale provision of second- 
class basic social services (health, education, 
leisure facilities) with no major structural 
changes (assistance-oriented approach). Both 
types always involve transfers of resources of 
different kinds and some degree of income 
redistribution, but always from the top down­
wards, without contemplating increased social 
and political participation as a requirement of
the “basic democratization”7 process, which is 
essential for the “other development”.
The outstanding feature of some of these 
attempts to formulate proposals that will recon­
cile the approaches to poverty and go beyond 
their limitations is the effort to adjust to the 
historical situation and estimate objectively 
and realistically the feasibility of bringing 
about such changes —of the most radical 
nature, extending even to their structural 
causes— as are considered necessary and pos­
sible in order to solve the basic needs problem. 
Here lies their chief merit. However, it is 
difficult for them to avoid the essential ambigu­
ity of resolving the structural inequality of the 
social classes without tackling the question of 
the dominant forces of society, the support of 
which is indispensable in order to attain the 
goal of eradicating poverty in conditions of 
social peace and within the status quo.
In some incrementalist lines of reasoning 
in relation to possible trade-ofis between basic 
needs and growth of production, it seems to be 
assumed that basic needs may mean a curb on 
growth, and this argument occupies an es­
sential place in the poverty approach. Accord­
ingly, it is affirmed that if such were the case it 
would have to be avoided by choosing the 
growth rather than the basic needs option. It is 
a much more complex matter than a zero-sum 
game in which one person wins and the other 
loses, however. The reconciliation of the basic 
needs approach with growth would certainly 
not be feasible with the present growth model, 
which in essence excludes other approaches, 
but only with another development style 
having an affinity to basic needs, that is, having 
different objectives not only in the economy 
(employment, income distribution, organiza­
tion of production, supply and demand for 
products) but also in society and politics 
(a more open, pluralistic, democratic and 
participatory society).
Accordingly, the assertion that the basic 
needs approach constitutes a threat to growth 
in general does not make sense, because what
7This concept is used in the same sense as that given 
to it by Karl Mannheim, Libertad y planificación social, 
translation by Rubén Landa, Mexico City, Fondo de Cul­
tura Económica, second edition, 1946,
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is really in question is the prevailing style of 
growth and capitalist development. This in­
evitably would be affected by a broad strategy 
for the satisfaction of human basic needs. There 
can be no possible trade-off with it if the aim is 
to preserve its present character. Any compat- 
ibilization of basic needs with growth—which 
is perfectly possible— calls for a structural 
change, even if only gradual, in the prevailing 
style of Latin American peripheral capitalism.8
4. Basic needs and Latin American 
political styles
In the light of the above reflections, the con­
cept of the satisfaction of basic needs is not 
only considerably more inclusive than the 
poverty concept, but also requires, in order to 
put it into practice, more drastic and extensive 
economic and social changes. In some recent 
international documents it is affirmed that the 
basic needs approach not only entails the 
transfer of resources to the poor, whether at 
the national or international level, but also 
calls for the restructuring o f  institutions, in­
cluding the credit system, trade patterns, mar­
ket structures, development of technology, 
and political power. It is also argued that a 
drastic restructuring o f  political and economic 
pow er is often needed, i f  the fruits o f  devel­
opm ent are to be extended to the vast majority 
o f  the population . What is proposed, therefore, 
is nothing less than a radical social and political 
transformation such as would very probably 
exceed the limits of change desirable or even 
tolerable to the groups in power in most of the 
Latin American countries. To many of the 
élites of these countries all this will sound like 
an invitation to commit hara-kiri.
A “drastic restructuring of political and 
economic power” and of economic “institu­
tions” (credit, trade, the market, technology) 
that would benefit the “vast majority of the 
population” could perhaps come about im­
8On structural maladjustments and the conflictive 
mode of growth of capitalism, see Raúl Prebisch, “A 
critique of peripheral capitalism”, CEPAL Review , N.° 1, 
first half of 1976, and “Socio-economic structure and crisis 
of peripheral capitalism”, CEPAL Review , N.° 6, second 
half of 1978.
perceptibly and without opposition over a 
very long period, but even then only when 
such changes were at the same time facilitated 
by trends which might be described as a 
“favourable historical chance”. In any case, 
the forces of change could not prevail without 
some conflicts, and even this would take too 
long for the expectant sectors to wait.
On the other hand, if an attempt were 
made to put the “other development” propos­
als into effect in a drastic manner, that is, 
rapidly, with determination and in their en­
tirety, it seems certain that their would en­
counter formidable opposition from the priv­
ileged groups currently controlling the prin­
cipal means and sources of economic, social 
and political power and benefiting from the 
prevailing style of development. Accordingly, 
the basic needs proposal involves the necessity 
of a veritable revolution and will therefore be 
rejected by the dominant classes as a threat 
against the established order.
I think this is the main reason why there 
has been a cooling-off of interest in the basic 
needs approach on the part of the governments 
of most of the Latin American countries. Thus, 
their increasing awareness of the concrete 
significance of the basic needs approach as a 
threat to the continuity of the established 
hegemonic order is causing them to depart 
from recent positions which, at least in princi­
ple, were closer to the spirit of this approach. I 
refer in particular to the approval of the ap­
praisals of the International Development 
Strategy (IDS) undertaken in Latin America 
(Quito, 1973; Chaguaramas, Trinidad and To­
bago, 1975; and Guatemala City, 1977), in 
which a critical evaluation was made of Latin 
America’s development from the point of view 
of social benefits for the people, and the 
governments proposed development measures 
and strategies designed to correct the acknowl­
edged deviations (concentration of income, 
unemployment and underemployment, pau­
perization, consumerism, growth of urban 
slums, etc.) observed in processes of rapid 
economic growth without generalized social 
well-being, i.e., with considerable masses ex­
cluded from the benefits of economic modern­
ization, and with widespread situations of 
poverty. It is also true that very few of the most
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important recommendations were imple­
mented and that economic growth in the 
majority of the Latin American countries main­
tained without much change its exclusive, 
inequitable, concentrative and socially dis­
torted characteristics.
For a better understanding of these reflec­
tions with respect to the feasibility of the basic 
needs approach as an alternative proposal it 
would seem necessary to give a clear idea of 
Latin America’s present political styles. Very 
briefly, in our opinion, the political régimes 
currently in force in Latin America9 consist of 
one or a combination of the following:
Traditional autocracies. These régimes, 
which are generally personalistic, familistic 
and oligarchical, are usually found in some of 
the more backward countries especially in 
Central America and the Caribbean, and are 
dominated by a caudillo-type leader with the 
support of the military, national special-inter- 
est groups and transnational corporations. 
Their inevitable doom as a result of the march 
of history is becoming daily more evident.
Technocratic authoritarian régimes. These 
can be military governments, or civilian 
governments supported and controlled by the 
armed forces. Although allied to minority sec­
tors, they operate in a state of great isolation 
from civilian society There is a veiy consid­
erable reduction in the participating political 
society, which is the result of the wide use of 
coercive measures deriving from the political 
hypertrophy of the State, all of which facilitates 
the design and implementation by the tech­
nocratic sectors of growth strategies which 
generate strong social opposition because they 
promote high income concentration in favour 
of both old and new groups forming part of the 
dominant coalition, but which are none the 
less imposed in the name of the most monopo­
litical of economic ideologies. As these régimes 
lack a majority popular consensus, they are in a 
continual state of crisis with respect to their 
legitimacy, which makes it all the more neces­
sary to impose their rule through the use of 
repression. In these cases, the economic pol­
icies followed have considerably accentuated
9ExcIuding Cuba.
the transnationalization of the economy, with 
systems in which there is heavy opening up to 
the exterior and insertion into the international 
market, with transnational coiporations linked 
or associated with national élites in technoc­
ratic and modernizing régimes which dis­
mantle and repress trade union and popular 
movements.
Elitist democracies. Although these ré­
gimes may promote populist policies, they are 
of an elitist type because in them popular 
participation is subject to relationships of 
clientism and patronage. The hegemonic 
system is based on limited alliances and 
unstable political and social commitments, 
owing mainly to serious and growing problems 
in connexion with the integration of new 
upward moving strata and sectors with in­
creasing social power which oppose the pre­
vailing sometimes benevolent but always 
authoritarian paternalism. In these régimes, 
democratization has meant that the distribution 
of income has mainly benefited the upper 
middle sectors, and has continued to be highly 
inequitable with respect to the lower half of the 
population living in conditions of extreme 
poverty and want. To sum up, a typical feature 
in these cases is the maladjustment between 
the considerable degree and extent of integra­
tion of the civilian society and the small capac­
ity of the political society to provide a channel 
for the participation and aspirations of the 
organized popular sectors. The popular legit­
imation of the political régime thus becomes a 
crucial problem.
The following are the most probable fu­
ture options of these régimes: an intensified 
process of democratization, that is, their evolu­
tion towards forms of greater political openness 
and popular participation in more truly democ­
ratic régimes within a pluralistic framework, 
with clearly defined objectives as regards the 
satisfaction of basic needs; or a regression to 
technocratic-authoritarian régimes of the type 
described earlier.
If these Latin American political scenarios 
are examined it is not difficult to conclude that 
any grounds for expecting a favourable recep­
tion for basic needs policies would at best be 
weak and contradictory. Inasmuch as the 
present governments and ruling circles are
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appealed to, their reactions will be —as they 
are now— acquiescent in form and negative in 
practice, and if, despite everything, their 
reactions are favourable, this will be thanks to 
international pressure and assistance.
5. The opening up and transnationalization 
o f  the Latin American economies
The new development strategies based on the 
opening up and internationalization of the 
domestic market, which began to be intensified 
as from the mid-1960s, and the prevailing 
trends of political change which crystallized 
with the generalized establishment of author­
itarian régimes —many of them of a military 
character— led to a considerable reduction in 
the participation of the people and the political 
demobilization of civilian society. It is in the 
context of these new development styles —of 
quite a different stamp and orientation from the 
previous populist political régimes, which 
tried to harmonize economic growth with some 
degree of social development— that the basic 
needs proposals are judged. The new strategies 
and policies aimed at opening up to the exterior 
are attempts to create an expansionary dynamic 
force in economic production, concentrated on 
the one hand in the external sector (exports 
and imports, financing, technology, increased 
participation of transnational corporations), 
and on the other in the internal diversification 
of a modem, sophisticated and “miniaturized” 
market within the reach only of the high- 
income groups. In short, the prevailing trends 
in Latin America in the past decade have been 
socially and politically regressive, if compared 
with parameters of the satisfaction of basic 
needs and radical democratization, or with the 
goals established in the International Devel­
opment Strategy.
The policies of opening up to the exterior 
and transnationalization have permitted a rapid 
growth of production in the modem sector, 
although with few external economies to step 
up the growth of the traditional sector which 
produces for the domestic market and accounts 
for the major part of employment.
Instead of growth “on two legs”, which 
would enable the modem and traditional sec­
tors to support and stimulate each other, the
internal structural heterogeneity that already 
existed has been further accentuated, with a 
marked impact on the levels of technological 
development and of productivity and regres­
sive effects on employment, income distribu­
tion and the living levels of the masses.
Although it may be argued that these 
undesirable effects of the prevailing economic 
growth models have been mainly due to a 
series of unavoidable interrelated causes and 
to the incapacity of important social sectors to 
adapt to the rules of a “free market economy”, 
the fact remains that the maladjustment be­
tween social development and economic 
growth has been one of the latent objectives 
(low costand passiveness of the labour force) of 
economic and political strategies imposed by 
force by the State in order to attract foreign 
capital while simultaneously facilitating access 
to the world market for labour-intensive low- 
priced products. With little historical or polit­
ical imagination, imitations were uncritically 
being made of models from Hong Kong, Singa­
pore, Taiwan, Malaysia and other capitalist 
mini-States whose export economies have 
grown at a dizzi pace under the protection of 
advantageous geo-political situations which 
were rarely taken properly into account or were 
even ignored altogether in appraising the 
international success of their economies.
There is really nothing casual about this 
state of affairs. The social sectors which lack 
organization and power, either because they 
never possessed them (the poor and marginal 
groups) or because their strength has been 
drastically reduced or destroyed by repression 
(unionized workers), have remained excluded 
from the technocratic strategies of economies 
which no longer depend on them in order to 
expand and benefit the privileged minorities. 
It is primarily a question of the enjoyment of 
power and the rationality of objectives, where 
the circles and groups controlling the State 
and other important social power mechanisms 
have every opportunity to impose their will, 
and do so as long as they can without hesitation. 
Their social ethics are diametrically opposed to 
those invoked in favour of a basic needs 
strategy.
In this political context it would seem 
ingenuous to try to convince those benefiting
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from this policy to do the opposite of what they 
are planning and doing to satisfy their own 
interests and maintain a status quo which is to 
their advantage. It is difficult to hide from them 
the fact that the basic needs approach brings 
with it an imperative need for social reforms 
and structural changes that will inevitably 
undermine their power bases, against which 
they are trying to defend themselves at both 
the internal and the international level.
The great expansion of international eco­
nomic relations favoured this growth model for 
more than a decade until the external expan­
sionary impetus was considerably reduced by 
the 1973 oil crisis and the world recession in 
1975 and the ensuing years, when the region's 
growth rate dropped steadily.10 The protec­
tionist measures adopted by the central coun­
tries helped to aggravate the crisis of the 
externally open model because it depends on a 
steady expansion of world demand, which did 
not grow at the expected rate and in some cases 
tended to remain stationary or even to contract.
Forecasts regarding the possible persis­
tence of the recession in the centres still 
further accentuate the reigning confusion, 
which is complicated by the emergence of 
group expectations and social and political 
demands calling for a return to the expansion of 
the domestic market for the masses and there­
fore contrary to the style involving opening up 
to the exterior prevailing in the major part of 
the region.
6. Basic needs and the new 
international order
The basic needs proposals are not compatible 
with any new system of international division 
of labour (the New International Economic 
Order). One of the great merits of the Ham­
marskjöld Report was precisely that it showed 
that basic needs —in the broad material and 
non-material sense envisaged there— can only 
be satisfied in the context of a specific new 
international order that assings priority to 
relations among developing countries based on
10Cf. CEPAL, “The Latin American economy in 1978; 
A preliminary balance”, in Notas sobre la economía y el 
desarrollo de América Latina, Santiago, Chile, Nos. 286/ 
287, January 1979, table 1, p. 2.
their own efforts, the full utilization of their 
human and natural resources, free and advanta­
geous association among them, and respect for 
their sovereignty and national rights. This 
complementary proposal called “collective 
self-reliance” has been developed in many 
studies, particularly in the Third World Forum 
and other groups interested in the formulation 
of alternative styles of development.
In contrast, the new international division 
of labour which is being forged through the 
growing transnationalization of economic 
relations is obviously not a proper basis for a 
new international economic order intended 
simultaneously to reduce international ine­
qualities and extreme internal economic and 
social disparities. The dominant élites of 
countries not wishing to make concessions to 
basic needs exert pressure to establish a new 
international economic order which is not 
compatible with them, and still less with 
collective self-reliance. This indeed is what 
appears to be happening in several large and 
medium-sized countries of Latin America, 
whose governments advocate an international 
economic order favouring their export preten­
sions without altering the position of internal 
domination of their ruling circles, nor trans­
forming the social bases of the power bloc. 
Their rejection of the basic needs approaches is 
becoming daily more vehement and evident.
For a clearer understanding of some of 
the preceding assertions, it seems necessary 
to introduce a more general approach to the 
basic needs question and its relationship with 
the New International Economic Order. The 
present international scenario is criss-crossed 
by historical currents and forces which are 
contradictory as regards the types of organiza­
tion they tend to impose at the world level. 
First, there is a contradiction between the 
affirmations of the cultural diversity and his­
torical identity of the national State on the one 
hand, vis-à-vis the emergence of an icreasingly 
interdependent and centripetal international 
order on the other. This means a progressive 
reduction of the principle of national sover­
eignty, curtailing the States’ operational auton­
omy and possibility of freely deciding the 
management of their economy and their par­
ticipation in global and regional security stra­
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tegies. Philippe de Seynes has highlighted 
this contrast and the “deep-seated tensions 
between the requirements of nationhood and 
die compelling vision o f‘One World’”.11
A second contradiction, which is more or 
less complementary to the former, is the di­
vergent nature and orientation of the two pro­
cesses of global interdependence, which in 
many ways are interlinked. The processes in 
question are the aforementioned internation­
alization of States on the one hand, and the 
transnationalization of the international divi­
sion of labour on the other. Here there is 
something more than a mere academic distinc­
tion between political and economic relations 
at the international level. Rather, the affir­
mation points to the structurally contradictory 
nature and the manifest and latent antagonisms 
of two spheres of relationships which although 
analytically distinguishable are actually close­
ly interrelated.
The national States are the principal actors 
in the process of internationalization, while 
transnational corporations play the same role in 
the process of transnationalization. These 
corporations dominate and control a major part 
of the flow of money and international fi­
nancing, the creation of innovations and the 
transfer of technology, international transport 
and communications, and also the cultural 
industry aimed at the masses which has an 
influence of fundamental importance, from the 
formation of consumption habits to that of 
political ideologies. Through various organs 
and associations, financial clubs, councils and, 
above all, the Trilateral Commission, trans­
national corporations co-ordinate their activ­
ities and interests, devise and disseminate a 
common ideology (monetarist neo-classicism) 
and endeavour to forge a political will at the 
world level which often decisively influences 
the international order of States.
The image of world unity and the type of 
interdependence established differ in the two 
processes, although they are by no means 
dissociated. Central capitalist States and trans­
national corporations live together in a relative
1 Philippe de Seynes, “The ‘futures’ debate in the 
United Nations”, CEPAL Review , N,w 3, first half of1977, p. 8.
symbiosis and maintain a peaceful co-existence 
which, however, is not free from tensions, nor 
are their actions and objectives completely 
convergent. In the case of transnational cor­
porations the domination motive appears to be 
such that their aim is nothing less than to make 
the internationalization process serve the 
needs of transnationalization. Some already 
see the national State as a historically obsolete 
entity which for that very reason has become 
an obstacle to the progress of trans national­
ization.
7 .T he  “impact” o f  transnationalization on 
the internal order
This whole complex web of international, 
strategic, political and economic relations is 
in many ways interlinked with the internal or­
der of the countries of the region. Some Latin 
American authors talk of peripheral capitalism 
while others —accentuating the dependency 
relationship— call this form of insertion into 
international economy associate capitalism. 
Notable in both cases is the close relationship 
established in the various countries between 
the interests of important sectors of their 
dominant business and political élites and 
those of transnational corporations operating 
in those countries and on the world market.
The constraints deriving from this linking 
of the interests of the national dominant classes 
with those of the transnational corporations 
depend on a number of factors which it would 
be out of place to analyse here. It should be 
noted, however, that this linkage has become 
particularly close in Latin America in the 
recent phase of growth based on strategies 
involving opening up to the exterior, that is, 
in the expansionist dynamics of a modem 
export sector and in the internationalization of 
the domestic market, the two areas in which 
the interests of the most important foreign and 
national enterprises converge and are associ­
ated in joint ventures or other types of con­
glomerates.
The markedly technocratic systems of 
domination which have been expanding since 
the mid-1960s have become increasingly 
opposed to structural reforms, to social policies 
which assign priority to employment and 
income distribution, and to the provision of
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better and more extensive public services to 
the poorest marginal strata.
In this new-style elitist technocracy, 
which is so contrary to the populist and redis­
tributive experiences of the past, the directors 
and strategists of economic growth ignore the 
immediate social effects of this type of system, 
which invariably tends to concentrate income, 
thereby aggravating the structural problems 
of poverty and marginality of the masses, 
while creating islands of prosperity for the 
ruling sectors. To ensure the functioning and 
stability of these growth systems based on 
opening up to transnationalization was not 
an easy task because they encountered strong 
social and political opposition which was only 
overcome through coersion exerted by authori­
tarian and repressive political régimes.
Accordingly, peripheral trans nationaliza­
tion is a process in which two streams, one 
internal and the other external, converge in a 
development style which harmonizes and 
favours the various interests of the dominant 
élites, the favoured sectors of the national 
economy, and international capital, but which 
at the same time leads to profound social 
conflicts and structural contradictions.
These systems involving opening up to 
the exterior were based on economic and 
social principles which represent a rejection 
of CEPAL’s tradition of structuralist thinking. 
Although its validity as an interpretation of 
the real situation in the region has not been 
discredited —indeed, it seems rather to be 
confirmed with the passage of time— the 
dominant classes which promote strategies 
linked with transnationalization base their ac­
tion on new economic, neo-classical and mon­
etarist currents of thought which are more in 
harmony with their authoritarian, technocratic 
and elitist styles of development This “new 
economy” has become something in the nature 
of an ideology produced by the transnational 
corporations for export.
8. Reception o f  the basic needs proposal in 
the Latin American setting
In those countries whose development styles 
involve opening up to the exterior the recep­
tion of the basic needs proposals has been
frankly negative. This attitude of rejection, 
however, is due not so much to the fact that 
the idea has been conceived and promoted 
in the North —which in a way is true— but to 
their clear recognition that its implementation 
would be incompatible and even contradictory 
with their economic strategies and the 
continuity of the established political régimes.
Hence the recent tendency to “interna­
tionalize poverty” and present the privation 
and misery of the masses as the moral respon­
sibility of all countries, but particularly the 
richest. In this respect it is argued that social 
justice at the internal level depends on 
whether it exists in the international sphere, 
i.e., on equity among nations. Until a satisfac­
tory new international economic order 
involving considerable transfers of resources 
and economic opportunities (in particular low- 
cost financing and access to the rich countries’ 
markets) is established, it is claimed, it will be 
impossible to solve the problems of hunger 
and poverty in the world. Furthermore, it is 
considered that because of the very magnitude 
of the problem a special programme of 
international aid would be needed to solve 
it.12
This is a deliberate, conscious political 
position by no means devoid of logic if account 
is taken of the internal relations of domination 
prevailing in Latin America, which it will be 
no easy task to change merely through moral 
persuasion. As noted earlier, many vested 
interests and forces of all kinds are concen­
trated in support of growth strategies which 
virtually exclude any real internal action aimed 
at satisfying basic needs, especially if such 
action requires considerable transfers of 
resources from the high-income groups, a more 
equitable transformation of income distribu­
tion, and control of the State and the power 
apparatus by society.
The present effort to promote the satisfac-
12This position was upheld at the OAS Assembly held 
in Washington in June 1978, where some statements by 
Latin American Ministers of Foreign Affairs clearly coin­
cided in this respect: hunger and poverty, rather than 
being a national responsibility, constitute a blemish on 
the world and regional communities, and their eradication 
is the primary responsibility of those who possess most, 
i.e., the richer countries.
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tion of basic needs, sometimes presented as a 
requirement for international assitance and the 
establishment of a new international economic 
order, is felt in the North to be an imperative 
need in order to elimate the dangers of an 
over-populated world with the majority of its 
inhabitants living in poverty. The population 
threat has become an obsession.
The attitude of the countries of the South, 
in contrast, is one of opposition to the basic 
needs approach, and this opposition becomes 
particularly intense when the solution of the 
basic needs problem entails putting into 
practice democratic political styles which are 
now anathema to most countries of the region. 
These countries are convinced that the basic 
needs approach is essentially a political 
proposal which questions the continuity of 
the status quo. Nor are they mistaken, because 
to convert the basic needs approach into real 
action that will not only enable the people to 
emerge from their state of poverty but will 
help them to attain their fulfilment as human 
beings requires internal structural reforms and 
development styles seeking as a priority objec­
tive the constant expansion of the basic 
democratization process.
9. A fin a l outline o f  the problem
In summarizing the political aspects of the 
basic needs approach it seems necessary to 
highlight several points. First, the internal 
requirements of an integral basic needs strate­
gy include a group of growth policies centred 
on domestic efforts and the expansion of the 
domestic market, on the redistribution of 
income, and on the restructuring of the mode 
of production (technology and employment) 
and the pattern of supply of the various 
products. None of this will constitute real 
social progress unless it is based on a democrat­
ic order and broader political participation by 
the whole nation.
Secondly, it also seems essential that 
growth strategies should aim at a process of 
modernization which would have as central 
objectives the harmonization and integration of 
the modem and traditional economic sectors in 
order to overcome the constraints of structural 
heterogeneity and productivity disparities, and
which would facilitate the increased absorp­
tion of the labour force into productive employ­
ment at rising rates of productivity. As long as 
the dynamics of growth are projected towards 
the exterior and the benefits of growth are 
concentrated in little islands of privilege and 
social minorities, there will be no possibilities 
whatever for the basic needs approach.
Thirdly, some proposals emphasize the 
need to focus attention on the rural sector 
because it is more backward and there are more 
poor and illiterate persons among its popula­
tion. It is suggested that this priority, which 
finds its strongest justification in the countries 
of Africa and Asia, is less and less realistic for 
Latin America in view of the region’s higher 
level and rate of urbanization and literacy. 
Latin American urbanization, however, far 
from providing a solution to the social prob­
lems of the agrarian sectors, merely represents 
the transfer of most of those problems to the 
cities, resulting in increasing slum areas and 
impoverishment for the largely unemployed 
and underemployed urban masses. Some ur­
banized countries may be afflicted by worse 
conditions of poverty than other more rural 
countries; there is not necessarily a relation­
ship between poverty and rural society, nor 
between the level of development (as mea­
sured by the per capita GNP) and the satisfac­
tion of basic needs.
Fourthly, reference has already been made 
to the problems arising with respect to basic 
needs on account of the contradictions be­
tween the international political order of States 
(internationalization) and the international 
economic order (transnationalization through 
the transnational corporations). The need for a 
specific  international order which will consid­
er basic needs as a central objective is thus 
clear. If maximum benefits for transnational 
corporations were one of the essential objec­
tives of the international economic order, how­
ever, or if international political relations were 
such that domination by the great Powers 
(through military pacts, areas of security and 
influence, ideological monolithism) consti­
tuted the chief raison d’être of such relations 
the basic needs approach would be neither 
promoted nor facilitated at the international 
level except, in the best of cases, as a residual
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factor. The proposal for a new international 
order which considers the satisfaction of basic 
needs as a central objective is that which is 
known as “collective self-reliance”. The recon­
ciliation of basic needs with the present inter­
national order, or with that which a good many 
Latin American countries would actually wish 
to promote, is perhaps feasible, but would 
inevitably be difficult so long as it depends on 
their present ruling circles and unequal styles 
of development. A historical change towards an 
open, democratic society and a more equitable 
international order would have to come first in 
order to create favourable conditions for the 
political promotion of the basic needs 
approach.
Finally, a last word about the internal 
political viability of a basic needs strategy. For 
such a strategy to be possible, it would be 
necessary first to discard the paternalistic 
systems, i.e., those operating from the top 
downwards, where everything is decided by 
the government. In addition, the merely assis­
tance-oriented transfer of resources to the poor 
and needy would have to be avoided as soon as 
possible. It should, on the other hand, be an 
imperative and urgent need to integrate these 
sectors in economic production, train them to 
produce more and in a more efficient manner, 
and educate them with a view to the full 
development of their personality as a requisite 
for the achievement of real large-scale partici­
pation by the people, which is essential if 
sustained and irreversible progress is to be 
made on all fronts: nutrition, employment, 
income, education, community participation 
and democratization. Furthermore, for a basic 
needs strategy to be successful, a broad politi - 
cal coalition controlling the state and govern­
ment is required in order to orient and streng­
then the strategy's implementation and, at the 
same time, overcome the inevitable and power­
ful opposition it will have to face before it is 
consolidated. The most serious problem is that 
of ensuring the control of the State apparatus by 
a fully participating and organized part of civil 
society.
In the dilemma between keeping only two 
systems of poverty eradication or advancing 
towards more comprehensive basic needs 
strategies, what are the possibilities for Latin
America in the light of its particular features as 
a different region of the Third World, i.e., one 
with an intermediate level of development, 
where several large, semi-industrialized 
countries are heavily dependent on an increas­
ingly absorbing process of transnational­
ization? What specific differences may emerge 
from their various political régimes and 
systems of domination as regards their recep­
tivity to the basic needs proposals? What will 
be the effects of the international economic 
trends with respect to a prolongation of the 
present recession, with its sequel of defensive 
measures adopted by the North (devaluation of 
the dollar, protectionism, stagnation of North- 
South negotiations in the various forums) and 
the consequent reactions of the Third World? 
Will this help to consolidate the Third World’s 
unity of action and economic and political 
interrelationships? And what repercussions 
may be expected from a further hardening of 
the relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, with a return to something like 
the cold war of the 1950s?
If these were the currents converging 
towards a possible scenario, what framework 
would be the objetive factors tending to facili­
tate or act as constraints on the action taken 
fit into and what would be the most feasible 
basic needs options? What strategies would 
have the best historical chances of being 
realized in Latin America? In other words, 
what are the “limits of the possible” and what 
are the “possibilities of the desirable”? Under 
the present changing circumstances, what 
new correlations of internal social forces will 
emerge and what are their attitudes to the 
basic needs approach likely to be? Who will 
support them, and what chances of success 
will they have?
Answering these questions is much more 
a practical problem than an intellectual effort 
of reflection, although it may be difficult to 
avoid having to make some forecasts and 
predictions. It is our impression that Latin 
America's present options are fairly narrow; 
but there should be more hope in the near 
future, when more propitious trends and 
possibilities for making real and continuing 
efforts to overcome the most ominous forms of 
human poverty are likely to emerge.
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Therefore, considering that whatever is 
discussed and prepared now will necessarily 
take some time to mature and be implemented, 
we consider that the initiative of attempting to 
achieve a genuine basic needs strategy is not 
unrealistic. Although the historical moment 
has not yet arrived, we are convinced that its
advent is possible. Therefore, it does not seem 
idle to embark now on something which may 
quite soon become a real possibility, because 
its materialization may well depend to a large 
extent on what is done beforehand in the 
matter.
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